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Kuhn vs. Popper on Criticism and Dogmatism in Science, Part II: How to 
Strike the Balance 
 
Darrell P. Rowbottom 
DarrellRowbottom@ln.edu.hk 
 
This paper is a supplement to, and provides a proof of principle of, Kuhn vs. Popper 
on Criticism and Dogmatism in Science: A Resolution at the Group Level. It 
illustrates how calculations may be performed in order to determine how the balance 
between different functions in science—such as imaginative, critical, and dogmatic—
should be struck, with respect to confirmation (or corroboration) functions and rules 
of scientific method. 
 
1. Introduction 
 
In a recent paper in this journal, I argued that the debate between Popper and Kuhn on 
whether scientists should be critical or dogmatic should be resolved by thinking at a 
higher level, namely the level of the group.1 I argued that it is typically preferable for 
the two kinds of activity to co-exist, along with imaginative/creative processes, and 
for the balance between them to alter in response to the context. I noted that the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1 I have now discovered that a similar move to group level considerations was suggested by Musgrave 
(1976), but as a critique of Lakatos’s view of science. I highly recommend reading this paper, which I 
am grateful to Professor Musgrave for drawing to my attention. 
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crucial question then becomes ‘How should the balance between functions be struck?’ 
But I did not show how to tackle it.2 
 
My task in the present paper is to remedy this situation, by providing a proof of 
concept of calculating how to strike the balance between functions. I will start with a 
simple model, and show how more complexity may be built in on a step-by-step 
basis. I will also outline a general procedure by which to generate competing models. 
 
Before I do this, I will revisit a few of my previous claims in order to make it clear 
precisely what I am endeavouring to show. First, consider the following analogy: 
 
Imagine you, the chess player, are managing science. The pieces are the 
scientists under your command, and their capacities vary in accordance with 
their type (e.g. pawn or rook). The position on the board—nature is playing 
the opposing side—reflects the status quo. And now imagine you are told that, 
against the rules of normal chess, you are allowed to introduce a new [piece] 
(which you can place on any unoccupied square)… (This is akin to the 
introduction of a new scientist; pieces working in combination on your side 
can be thought of as research groups, and so on.) Some moves will be better 
than others, given your aim of winning the game, and in some circumstances it 
will be clear that one available move is best. (Rowbottom 2011a, p. 124) 
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
2 I also added that ‘It may prove to be… beyond our power to answer satisfactorily except in highly 
idealized contexts.’ (Rowbottom 2011a, p. 124) However, computer simulations allow us to introduce 
more complexity than we can handle via traditional philosophical methods. 
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I was at pains to emphasize that there is nothing relativistic or debilitating, from the 
point of view of mainstream philosophy of science, about this picture. On the 
contrary, my intent was to suggest that we can employ existing logical resources—by 
which I mean resources from the logical tradition in the philosophy of science, such 
as confirmation functions3—to inform our account of what the group should do rather 
than what each (and every) individual should do. I added that: 
 
I have not denied that there is a fact of the matter about what an individual 
scientist might best do (or best be directed to do) in a particular context of 
inquiry. Rather, I have suggested that determining what this is requires 
reference not only to the state of science understood as a body of propositions 
(or as knowledge) but also to what other scientists are doing and the 
capacities of the individual scientist. (Rowbottom 2011a, 123–124) 
 
In summary, I therefore claimed not only that ‘How should the balance between 
functions be stuck?’ can be answered, but also that it can be answered in a way that is 
compatible with the logical tradition in the philosophy of science (and in particular, 
the view that theories have measurable degrees of confirmation or corroboration). So 
this, in full, is what I shall endeavour to show in what follows. 
 
Before I continue, however, I should make it explicit that both epistemic and 
pragmatic ends underpin the ‘how should’ question. For example, some distributions 
of labour might maximise the probability of truth likeness of the theoretical products 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
3 More specifically, I wrote: ‘I take there to be measures… even if they are rough measures… of how 
theories (and/or research programmes, modelling procedures, etc.) are faring. And these, given the 
resources at our disposal, determine how we should respond.’ (Rowbottom 2011a, p. 124) 
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of science (which may be seen as an epistemic good), while nevertheless rendering 
science terribly inefficient in some respects, e.g. slow and costly in theory production 
(qua endorsement). So answering the ‘how should’ question requires us to be clear 
about what we want from science (given the external constraints imposed in any given 
context, e.g. funding and available womanpower). Naturally, this will be delimited by 
what we think that science can ideally achieve (in said context); and hence, opinions 
will be divided along realist and anti-realist lines, among others.4 So for present 
purposes, I wish to leave this question relatively open. All I shall assume is that 
everyone will agree that there are more or less efficient ways of organising science, 
and that the question has bite in this respect (at the bare minimum). To return to the 
earlier chess analogy, it is better to force checkmate in three moves rather than five 
moves, if it is possible to do so. 
 
I also should emphasise that I am mainly concerned, for the present, with the question 
of how the balance should be struck in principle, rather than what should be done in 
practice to strike it (or to get as close as possible to striking it). Answering the in 
principle question is important, in my view, for answering the in practice question 
properly. Think of it this way. When creating a model for some specific purpose, it is 
useful to have some kind of idea of what you would include in a complete model (i.e., 
one where complexity were no obstacle). You can then think about the situations for 
which your model is intended; call these the contexts of application. You can leave 
out factors that would be in the complete model but won’t, you anticipate, make much 
difference in the target contexts of application. You can also try to find ways to 
account for relevant factors that you aren’t able to include in a computationally 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
4 Personally, due to my instrumentalist tendencies, I am strongly inclined to thinking of the matter in 
purely pragmatic terms. But there is no need to do so. 
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tractable way. And so forth.5 This fits with the way that Muldoon and Weisberg 
(2011, p. 162) describe the modelling process: ‘we must rely on idealizations to 
reduce the complexity… [but] not… so extreme that we lose the ability to explain’. 
 
I might also add that intervening in science, e.g. as a research manager, will often 
have direct consequences that I won’t take into account; for example, it might cause 
resentment and therefore have a negative effect on output. When I talk of distribution 
of labour in principle, I am working with the idealisation that no consequences of this 
kind will occur. (If liked, to return to the chess analogy, I assume that what the pieces 
do won’t be affected by who moves them and how. And in saying this, I am not 
presupposing that they are moved, as a matter of fact.) But this assumption must be 
relaxed if one is to tackle the in practice question seriously. 
 
Finally, on a somewhat related note, I should say something about the scope of my 
subsequent discussion. I will write as if I am discussing only the whole of science. 
But similar considerations may instead be used to determine the proper way to strike 
the balance within smaller units of inquiry, such as sub-disciplines or research groups. 
The only difference is that extra considerations—or higher-order models—may also 
be required. If one is faced with the in practice question of how best to organise a 
specific research group, for example, one may consider the relative prospects of 
competing with other groups rather than attempting to carve out a new niche. Such 
issues have already been considered by Kitcher (1990, 1993) and Strevens (2003). 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
5 Take building a model of planetary motion in our solar system as a case in point. A complete model 
would include the positions of all heavenly bodies that exert gravitational forces, inter alia. It is clear 
that leaving out some of these, e.g. cosmic dust and anything in other galaxies, is fine for arriving at 
reasonably accurate predictions of the orbital paths of the planets. Leaving out dwarf planets—such as 
Eris, Chiron, and Pluto—is more questionable. 
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2. A Simple Model 
 
Let’s assume that we’ve agreed on a confirmation or corroboration function, because 
the following account is intended to be compatible with all the contenders for this 
role.  (In what follows, I will use ‘confirmation’ loosely, so as to cover anti-
inductivist accounts of corroboration.) Such functions are typically defined in terms 
of conditional probabilities, which involve three distinct types of argument: 
hypotheses (h), evidence (e), and background statements (b).6 Most obviously, this 
goes for Bayes’s theorem; see, for example, Salmon (1990). But here are some other 
examples (along with references to their advocates): 
 
 
 Popper (1983)7 
 
 
Milne (1996) 
 
 
Huber (2008) 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
6 How to understand b is a rather fascinating question. Should it be indexed to the present, or to the past 
point at which the hypothesis h was generated? And should it be thought of as background knowledge, 
or as something else? On these topics, see Musgrave (1974), Williamson (2010, p. 4–6), and 
Rowbottom (2011b, p. 90–92; In Press B). 
7 For some of the problems with this function, in the broader context of Popper’s philosophy, see 
Rowbottom (In Press A). 
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I should like to point out, however, that none of the following depends on the 
existence of precise valued confirmation ratings of theories, or even absolute, rather 
than relative, measures of confirmation. One may instead imagine that we only have a 
way to rank theories or research programmes with respect to fruitfulness to date. Then 
it will be possible to consider the following in terms of numerical intervals. (If we can 
say that one theory is between two and three times as confirmed as another, or even 
just more confirmed than any other, for example, then this may provide constraints on 
how to organise science.) 
 
Now let’s consider a toy methodological rule:  
 
Distribute labour such that the work performed on each alternative (theory or 
research programme) is proportional to its relative degree of confirmation.8 
 
I am not endorsing this rule. I just wish to show how one can balance on this rule. In 
fact, I believe that such rules are context sensitive (or conditional) and numerous. But 
I don’t want to overcomplicate the discussion until later. Suffice it to say that there 
may be some points, in science, at which it is reasonable to follow this rule. This 
becomes rather more plausible if we consider it as a ceteris paribus affair, in the same 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
8 Note that this leaves room for including ‘catch alls’, i.e. degrees of confirmation for ‘no available 
theory is true’ or equivalently ‘some unavailable theory is true’, although I do not include these in the 
following example for reasons of simplicity. It seems plausible that distributing labour to these 
alternatives would amount to performing imaginative/theory-construction work, as discussed below in 
section 3.1. This recognition makes the rule appear more plausible than it otherwise might. (Thanks to 
a referee for raising the idea of ‘catch alls’ here.) 
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way that we do many of our scientific laws.9 To draw an analogy, we say that ‘All 
iron bars expand when heated’ although there are clearly circumstances in which it is 
possible to heat an iron bar without any expansion occurring. (It is true that scientific 
laws are descriptive, whereas methodological rules are normative, but this is no 
obstacle. For instance, there may be times at which a Christian must breach one of the 
Ten Commandments in order to obey another.) In any event, I shall later return to the 
subject of methodological rules, and show that nothing rides on this particular rule 
ever being appropriate.10 To foreshadow that subsequent discussion, what ultimately 
matters is that the appropriate rules are sufficiently similar in character to also be 
applicable; and all this takes is that they rule out a relevant class of ways to organise 
science. 
 
With our toy rule in place, let’s consider a simple situation in which there are just two 
competing (mutually exclusive) theories, T1 and T2. Let C(T1) represent the absolute 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
9 On ceteris paribus laws (and provisos), see Canfield and Lehrer (1961), Hempel (1988), Cartwright 
(1983), and Earman and Roberts (1999). 
10	  One might argue against the toy rule by pointing to historical situations in which theories with little 
or no confirmation, over a considerable period of time, eventually emerged as superior to their rivals. 
Take Wegener’s plate tectonics theory, mentioned by one of the referees of this paper, as a case in 
point. Doesn’t the success of this, over that of earlier alternatives, show that following the toy rule is 
unwise? I think not, because the rule may be understood as a proposed means to improve efficiency in 
the long run, in a particular class of situations. And the fact that following the rule reduces efficiency in 
some situations does not mean that it does not improve efficiency overall, in the class of situations in 
which it is to be applied. (That is, for example, as against not employing the rule.) Similarly, the rule of 
‘bet on a heads result’ may help you to win in the long run, on bets of whether a biased coin lands on 
heads or tails. But in some cases, following the rule will lead to losses. Nevertheless, there may be no 
better rule available. (One might also think there is something that makes the plate tectonics case 
‘special’, such that the rule should not be applied; it is unclear to me, however, what that might be.) My 
worry about the toy rule is therefore slightly different. I wonder if we have empirical evidence, from 
the history of science, that following it would improve efficiency overall in some clear kind of 
situations. 
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confirmation value of T1, and C(T2) represent the absolute confirmation value of T2. 
Let’s first define a relative confirmation/corroboration value, in order to help us to 
apply our rule: 
 
 	  
 
In general, if T1 is n times as confirmed as T2 then R(T1, T2) will be n. So the fraction 
of total work we will want performed on T1, according to our methodological rule, 
will be:  
 
  
 
We will want the remainder of the total work to be performed on T2, as it is the only 
available alternative. The next step is to consider how to bring the appropriate balance 
into being. To do this, we need to think about the scientists we have available and 
their properties. 
 
Let’s say that we have m scientists. To a first approximation, we might add that each 
scientist has a criticism skill, CR, and a puzzle solving skill, PZ. Each may be 
assigned a value between unity and zero: 1 is the highest skill level possible, and 0 is 
the lowest skill level possible. But this is plausibly a bit too simplistic, because ability 
to be critical and solve puzzles is context dependent. So we really need criticism skills 
and puzzle solving skills in different domains. In this case, each scientist will have a 
CR(T1), PZ(T1), CR(T2), and PZ(T2) property. (This may still be too simplistic. One 
R(T1,T2 ) =
C(T1)
C(T2 )
€ 
R(T1,T2)
1+ R(T1,T2)
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can sub-divide skills too. In line with Rowbottom (2011a), for example, puzzle 
solving involves doing more than one thing. We will return to this issue 
subsequently.) 
 
We also need to think about how hard the scientists will work, in spite of their ability, 
i.e. how industrious they will be. Again, give this a value between unity and zero 
which is domain specific: I(T1) and I(T2). For the moment, assume that this value is 
fixed for any individual independent of their research environment, and that there’s no 
variation between how industrious a scientist is when performing one function rather 
than another, e.g. criticising rather than puzzle solving. (These are further false 
oversimplifications. Yet again, we shall return to them. Such is the nature of model 
building.11) 
 
We can now define work output potentials for each scientist. Let’s make the 
assumption that any given scientist can only be actively using either CR or PZ skills 
at any point in time, and can only be operating these skills on one theory at any point 
in time. This is reasonably realistic. But we must allow that the proper distribution of 
labour can change very quickly, indeed from moment to moment. Consider the earlier 
chess analogy. Time changing is like the position on the board changing. A piece that 
was previously performing a crucial role may now be contributing little or nothing. It 
may even be surplus to requirements. 
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
11 This is true in physics no less than here. Idealizations and approximations are rife in modelling, as 
discussed, for instance, in Hesse (1966), Gentner & Gentner (1983), Laymon (1990), Frigg & Reiss 
(2009), and Rowbottom (2009, 2011d). Often it is a sensible procedure to start simply and then modify 
slowly, as required, in order to render the model more realistic. 
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We may now define a scientist’s work output potentials, which range from 0 to 1, as 
follows:  
 
 I(T1)iCR(T1)i 
I(T1)iPZ(T1)i 
I(T2)iCR(T2)i  
I(T2)iPZ(T2)i. 
 
The subscripts represent to whom each property belongs. So I(T1)i  represents how 
industrious scientist i will be when working on theory T1, PZ(T2)i represents scientist 
i’s puzzle solving skill with T2, and so forth. 
 
The work potentials, so defined, have several intuitively appealing features. Let’s 
consider I(T1)iCR(T1)i for illustrative purposes, and restrict the discussion to work on 
criticising T1. The possible values of this potential range between zero and unity; 
unity corresponds to the maximum output potential possible for a scientist (which one 
could index to the best scientist available, or define in terms of the ideal scientist), 
whereas zero corresponds to no output potential. If the scientist’s industry property—
I(T1)i—is zero, then the work potential will be zero irrespective of her skill; no effort 
has no results. But if the industry property is positive, by contrast, then the work 
potential will be in direct proportion to the scientist’s skill. Another interesting feature 
is as follows. Let one scientist be half as skilled but twice as industrious as another. 
On such a model, each scientist will have the same work output potential. (If this 
feature is not desired, it is easy to alter the function appropriately. For example, a 
threshold of skill, below which the function’s value is zero, may be introduced. This 
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fits with the idea that a very low skilled worker won’t produce anything of value even 
if he works exceedingly hard.) 
 
From the work output potentials of a scientist, we know where she would be best 
placed from the point of view of maximising her personal output. One thing we might 
already want to say on the prior assumptions—at least, if we add an additional 
plausible rule that we want to maximise the total work performed—is that we do not 
want to assign a scientist a task for which she has a zero work output potential. If we 
relax some of the prior assumptions, this may change. For example, the presence of an 
unproductive scientist in a research group might have a strong positive effect on the 
work output potentials of the other scientists therein. Thus there may be a net gain in 
including him in the group, even if he contributes little directly. 
 
We can now imagine outlining finitely many possible distributions of labour, the 
number of which will depend on the number of scientists available. In each case, we 
can sum the personal work output potentials for each available task, to see how much 
work we can expect to be done in criticising T1 (WCRT1), in puzzle solving using T1 
(WPZT1), in criticising T2 (WCRT2), and in puzzle solving using T2 (WPZT2). In 
mathematical notation, we have: 
 
WCRT1 =  
WPZT1 =  
WCRT2 =  
I(T1
i=a
b
∑ )iCR(T1)i
I(T1
i=c
d
∑ )i PZ(T1)i
I(T2
i=e
f
∑ )iCR(T2 )i
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WPZT2 = 	  
	  
where the group of scientists criticising T1 is {a, …,  b}, the group of scientists 
puzzle solving with T1 is {c, …, d}, and so forth. 
 
Now in general, a sub-set of the possible divisions of labour will come closest to 
obeying the rule: 
 
	  
 
 
Alternatively, in terms of the more fundamental quantities, this rule may be expressed 
as: 
	   	  
 
 
Indeed, there may be a unique balance between dogmatism and criticism that obeys, 
or comes closest to obeying, this particular rule. If there is not, there will be a range of 
allowable balances and a free choice between them. 
 
In the next section, I want to consider how the model can be improved, and rendered 
more realistic, in line with some of the previous asides concerning the assumptions 
I(T2
i=g
h
∑ )i PZ(T2 )i
€ 
WCRT1 +WPZT1
WCRT2 +WPZT2
=
R(T1,T2)
1+ R(T1,T2)
I(T1)i
i=a
b
∑ CR(T1)i + I(T1)i
i=c
d
∑ PZ(T1)i
I(T2 )i
i=e
f
∑ CR(T2 )i + I(T2 )i
i=g
h
∑ PZ(T2 )i
=
C(T1)
C(T1) + C(T2 )
Preprint – Forthcoming in Studies in History and Philosophy of Science 
14 
used above. In the final section, I will discuss how the situation with respect to rules 
is/should be much more complex. 
 
However, the mechanism by which to determine the appropriate balance, even when 
further complexity is added, will be the same: 
 
(1) Work out the ideal distribution of labour (with reference to data such as 
confirmation values, and other aspects of the state of inquiry). 
 
 (2) List all the possible ways that science could be set up. 
 
 (3) Use a function to select those closest to—or acceptably close to—the ideal. 
 
3. Refinements to the Model: A Smörgåsbord 
 
The model outlined above can be refined in numerous ways, many of which involve 
relaxing assumptions made in the previous section. In what follows, in a number of 
sub-sections, I will cover a variety of potential alterations that I consider to be of 
special interest in making the model more realistic. I will not be concerned, until later, 
with the rules of inquiry (such as the toy rules used previously); rather, I will be 
concerned with what the rules may concern. For example, I introduce the imaginative 
(or theory-construction) function because there is plausibly a balance that must be 
struck between this and the other two functions—criticism and puzzle solving—
discussed above. 
 
Preprint – Forthcoming in Studies in History and Philosophy of Science 
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My aim is to focus on reasonably broad factors that will often be significant not only 
in science in general, but also in smaller research groups. The values of interaction 
coefficients (discussed in 3.3), for instance, may be determined by a wide variety of 
psychological considerations. But I do not delve deeply into such possible 
considerations; instead, I provide examples designed to illustrate how the output of 
some group may not be a simple sum of the output that each individual would give 
when working in isolation. 
 
3.1. Additional Functions: Imaginative/Theory-Constructing 
 
The previous treatment assumes that scientists only perform two different kinds of 
function. If science were truly so limited, however, then it is plausible that little 
progress, if any, would be possible. There would be no means (within science itself) 
by which to generate new theories. Scientists would be stuck with using theories 
generated by others, e.g. folk theories. 
 
This is why I have previously proposed, following Popper, that something akin to an 
imaginative function is crucial for science (Rowbottom 2011a). But it is important to 
understand this broadly. If preferred, this may be thought of as merely a theory-
constructing function; and then we may leave open the question of the extent to which 
imagination is involved in this creative activity, which may prove somewhat divisive. 
I will continue to use the phrase ‘imaginative function’, however, for reasons of 
consistency. 
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Such a function may be represented by IM. Hence, in line with the prior treatment of 
CR and PZ, we may say that IM(Tj)i represents the imaginative skill of scientist i with 
respect to theory j (and multiplying this value by I(Tj)i will give a work potential). 
Naturally this does not, however, represent the ability of scientist i to create j; rather, 
it represents her skill when it comes to generating possible replacements for j. This 
skill need not, and plausibly should not, be construed merely as reflecting the ability 
to generate a particular quantity of potential replacements. The quality of the theories 
a scientist is able to generate, measured in terms of supra-empirical theoretical virtues 
such as simplicity and scope, may also be significant. (Accuracy and fruitfulness 
cannot generally be ascertained beforehand; the other functions explore these.12) 
 
Note that defining imaginative skill in such a way is consistent with adopting the view 
that variations in theory-construction ability are only domain specific. That’s to say, 
we may imagine that IM(Tj)=IM(Tk), for any given scientist, if theories j and k are in 
the same area of science, e.g. fluid mechanics or quantum chemistry. I leave open the 
question of whether this is so, and of how large the appropriate areas should be 
understood to be if it is.13 
 
Some will think that there are further central functions in science—beyond CR, PZ, 
and IM—whereas I do not. I will not dwell on this, however, since I trust it is easy to 
see how further functions might be introduced. 
 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
12 I use ‘fruitfulness’ in the sense of Kuhn (1977, p. 322): ‘a theory should be fruitful of new research 
findings: it should, that is, disclose new phenomena or previously unnoted relationships among those 
already known’.  
13 My own view is that variations are often more subtle than this, and may depend on differences in 
internal features of the theories, e.g. the mathematics involved. 
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3.2. Sub-Functions: Offensive, Defensive, Evaluative, Classificatory/Predictive, 
Aligning, and Articulating 
 
To say that two scientists are both puzzle solving (or contributing to the puzzle 
solving effort) is not to say that they are both doing precisely the same kinds of thing, 
because puzzle solving can involve a range of different activities. And the same is 
true, mutatis mutandis, for performing a critical function (or contributing to the 
critical effort). So if we think of the functions discussed up to this point as primary, 
we may also say that there are sub-functions that serve to constitute them. To use a 
simple example: to devote all one’s effort to attacking a specific popular scientific 
theory may make no less a critical contribution to science than devoting all one’s 
effort to evaluating the relative strengths and weaknesses of the competing theories in 
a specific area of science (such as the biomechanics of biped locomotion). 
 
So what kind of sub-functions might there be? I have already mentioned two: 
offensive and evaluative. And if we add to this a defensive function, then I believe we 
have all the central aspects of critical activity. Let’s denote the skill in performing 
each sub-function, for some scientist i with respect to theory (or group of theories) j, 
as follows: OF(Tj)i; DF(Tj)i; and EV(Tj)i. As with the imaginative function, discussed 
above, it may be helpful to think in terms of areas of science in order to compare the 
values for these. For example, it is natural to think that EV(T1)i = EV(T2)i for any 
good evaluator if T1 and T2 are competing scientific theories. 
 
I take each of these activities to be reasonably self-explanatory, and discussed them in 
the parent paper (Rowbottom 2011a), so will not dwell too much on explaining them. 
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I will draw attention only to two things. First, those performing each kind of activity 
will often interact (even if only indirectly, i.e. by engaging with one another’s work) 
in significant ways. Those defending will seek to address criticisms made by 
attackers, just as attackers will seek to challenge defensive work. Evaluators will try 
to take a balanced view on the state of the debate (whether or not they are also 
participants in it), with careful attention to the arguments advanced on either side. 
Good evaluators will succeed in doing so. 
 
Second, those performing these sub-functions will be relying on the work of puzzle 
solvers. The success of puzzle solvers may be taken to reflect not merely on their own 
competence (contra what Kuhn (1962) suggests is proper in normal science), but also, 
to some extent, on the quality of the theories that they employ. (The estimated 
expertise of the relevant puzzle solvers can be taken into account in making a 
judgement.) If T1 and T2 are competing (mutually exclusive) theories, and the former 
can be used to solve a puzzle that the latter cannot (in the current state of play), then 
this may tell in the former’s favour (e.g. if equal work has been done on trying to 
solve the puzzle with each). Indeed, some puzzle solving activity may be understood 
as fulfilling a testing role, even if it is not intended for that purpose, as we will see 
below.14 
  
We are left with the sub-functions of puzzle solving. Following Kuhn (1962, chapter 
3), I take these to be three in number: classificatory/predictive, aligning, and 
articulating. We can denote the skill in performing each of these sub-functions, for 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
14 Nevertheless, there are grounds for thinking that actively seeking to refute theories is important. One 
reason is that this may serve to prevent the use of selective evidence (e.g. which focuses merely on 
confirming instances). See Rowbottom (2011b, pp. 94–95).   
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some scientist i with respect to theory (or group of theories) j, as follows: CP(Tj)i; 
AL(Tj)i; and AR(Tj)i.  
 
I have discussed each elsewhere—see Rowbottom (2011c)—so will here give only an 
overview. Classification involves the collection of data that is considered important 
on the basis of the dominant theories of the day; this could be anything from the 
spectrum of a star to the Young’s modulus of a newly synthesized material. Prediction 
is a key role for this data (in principle if not always in practice). The spectrum of a 
star may be used (in conjunction with other data) to predict how far away it is from 
Earth. The Young’s modulus of a newly synthesized material serves to predict what 
can be built with it. And so forth. (The case could be made that a scientist may be 
good at prediction but bad at classification, in some domain, or vice versa. This can 
easily be dealt with by splitting this sub-function into two component parts.) 
 
Alignment involves ‘fitting theories to facts’, or more precisely extending the 
applicability of existing theories. A good way to understand this—although not 
explicitly Kuhn’s—is in terms of model development. One begins with a relatively 
simple model, such as that of the simple pendulum, and then seeks to refine it by 
reducing the degree of idealization. The mass of the rod bearing the bob and the 
friction at the bearing may be taken into account, for instance. Naturally, exactly 
when one is generating a new model rather than a new theory may be somewhat 
murky, but we need not concern ourselves with this directly. 
 
Articulation, the final activity, is somewhat more nebulous in character. One clear 
aspect is the measurement of central constants in theories, such as the gravitational 
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constant, the permittivity of free space, and Planck’s constant. However, articulation 
may also involve experimental attempts to explore ambiguous aspects of the dominant 
paradigm (qua disciplinary matrix), and more particularly the theories therein. In 
Rowbottom (2011c), I suggest that the EPR experiments may be cast in this light; 
what it means for variables to be non-commuting is investigated (if we try to frame 
matters in a way that doesn’t presuppose realism). If this is incorrect, however, then 
we may think of articulation as considerably narrower than Kuhn suggests. 
 
These activities are just as intertwined as their critical counterparts. Consider, for 
instance, how developing a better theoretical model of actual pendulums (alignment) 
may aid in geophysical measurements of g (classification), and how these better 
measurements might in turn help in determining G more accurately (articulation). 
Alternatively, rather more in the abstract, consider how classification and prediction 
can reveal new practical possibilities that enable the construction of new instruments. 
These instruments may in turn lead to developments in all areas of puzzle solving. 
 
Progress in one activity may therefore depend on the products from another activity. 
And this brings me to a point that I failed to emphasize as much as I should have in 
the parent paper: namely, that the correct way to maximize productivity with respect 
to one area/function, over an extended period, may not be to maximize the amount of 
work done in that area. Needless to say, this goes for sub-functions as well as (so 
called) primary functions. Critical activity may sometimes be superior than it would 
otherwise be, for instance, when it draws upon recent (negative or positive) results in 
puzzle solving. In fact, diachronically speaking, I believe that most pairs of functions 
or sub-functions are symbiotic. Ideally, this should be factored in when generating 
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balancing rules. (An alternative approach is to make total output from an area 
dependent on outputs from elsewhere, and not just work done directly in the area. 
There are a variety of mathematical ways that this could be done.) 
 
There is one final question we should tackle before moving on. How do skill values 
for sub-functions relate to skill values for the functions of which they are a part? 
There are several modelling possibilities. One option is to understand the skill values 
for functions as intervals, with minima and maxima equal to the lowest and highest 
values of the relevant sub-functions. (So if the highest value of a critical sub-function 
for some scientist is unity, and the lowest value of a critical sub-function is one half, 
the interval will be between unity and one half.) A precise value to be used in 
calculations may be determined by direct reference to the active sub-function in some 
(actual or hypothetical) scenario. That is, when possibilities concerning division of 
labour are enumerated in such a way as to pay attention to the sub-functions being 
performed. 
 
Another option is to fix function skill values to the highest value of the relevant sub-
functions. This may be helpful when performing calculations concerned simply with 
balancing at the level of the functions (rather than their components). And one can 
imagine other alternatives, such as looking to the lowest values of the sub-functions. 
There is no ‘right and wrong’ here; it is simply about what one wishes to calculate. 
Since to introduce sub-functions is to admit that they are more fundamental than the 
functions of which they are a part, on an individual level, there is a sense in which 
talk of higher-level individual functions may be an artifice. Alternatively, the critical 
and puzzle solving functions may be emergent. And here is a final idea on this topic: 
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we may think that skill values for functions are properties of groups of scientists, 
rather than individuals, whereas individual skills concern sub-functions. This fits well 
with the introduction of interaction factors, as discussed below. 
 
3.3. Interaction Coefficients 
 
To determine how well a group will perform some task is not simply a matter of 
considering how well each member of the group would perform the task if working 
alone. We know this all-too-well from team sports, such as football. A team 
composed of elite players may be defeated by another team with significantly less 
able players, but superior teamwork. And the same is true in science; the skill of a 
group is not, in general, an additive function of the skills of its members. 
 
In the first instance, one might therefore consider assigning a teamwork value, or 
some such, to each scientist. This would be misguided, however, because the relation 
of working well together is not transitive. To be more specific, let Mr. A work well 
with Mrs. B, and Mrs. B work well with Ms. C. It does not follow that Mr. A works 
well with Ms. C! The reasons may be rather mundane. Perhaps Mr. A finds Ms. C 
very attractive, and becomes flustered in her presence. The situation might be even 
worse, for science but not for love, if Mr. A’s feelings are reciprocated! 
 
It therefore appears that we should introduce an interaction factor for each possible 
group, which may be used when calculating its total work output. In general, any set 
of scientists, {1, …, n}, will have an interaction coefficient which we can denote by 
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η1
n; and we may allow such a coefficient to take any positive value, in principle.15 We 
may then multiply our original expressions for total work outputs by these 
coefficients. For example, our expression for WCRT1 for some group {a, … , b) will 
become: 
 
WCRT1 = ηab	   
 
Naturally, it is possible to understand the value of such a group interaction coefficient 
as dependent on a number of personal interaction coefficients, i.e. to think of the 
output of each and every scientist as being affected differently, in some specific way, 
by their group membership. And one might specify these if a more complex and 
sensitive model is desired. 
 
Matters can be further complicated by the recognition that such interaction 
coefficients may be activity specific, e.g. that a group of scientists may work well 
together when performing one sub-function, but poorly together when performing 
another. The reasons may be many and varied. Some scientists may get bored when 
doing some things, and then behave in ways that distract others. Some scientists may 
be more prone to work avoidance, e.g. surfing the net or reading e-mails, when 
working alone rather than in close collaboration with others; and performing some 
sub-functions may involve close collaboration, whereas performing others may not. 
 
3.4. Temporal and Experiential Variance 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
15 Negative values may also be introduced, for similar reasons as those suggested in the final sub-
section. 
I(T1
i=a
b
∑ )iCR(T1)i
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It is also possible to allow the properties of scientists to vary across time and in 
response to experience, i.e. for values such as OF(Tj)i to be functions of time and 
experience. Let’s consider the career of a hypothetical scientist for illustrative 
purposes. In her youth, she may be daring and adventurous; she may be highly 
imaginative and a sharp critic (especially in attack). But as she ages, she may mellow. 
She may become rather more set in her ways, i.e. less willing to entertain alternatives 
to the theories that she has spent so much time working with. As a result, her 
imaginative and offensive skills (in her specific area of science) may diminish. But in 
their place, more refined defensive and puzzle solving skills—again, with her 
preferred theories—may emerge. Thus she may be just as talented towards the 
twilight of her research career as she was when she was beginning, but in rather 
different respects. 
 
The lesson is that it is valuable, when considering what best to do from a diachronic 
perspective, to think not only about what effect a scientist will have if she performs 
some particular task, but also about what effect performing that task will have on the 
scientist. 
 
3.5. Other Refinements 
 
Many other refinements are possible. But I should like to mention just two more 
possibilities. The first, which may sometimes be an alternative to using interaction 
factors, is to allow for negative values for skills (and to make these skills context 
sensitive). The underlying idea is that some scientists may be rather worse than totally 
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unproductive! A scientist working in an area in which they had a negative skill value 
would be (actively) detrimental to that area.  
 
The second notion is that the extent to which an individual is industrious may be task 
relative. This could be handled relatively easily, simply by making I values function 
(or even sub-function) specific: ICR; IPZ; IIM; etc. A critical work output potential for 
scientist i relative to theory j, for example, might then be: ICR(Tj)iCR(Tj)i.. One 
significant reason underlying differences in industry will be motivation; and 
motivation may be affected by rewards systems. This provides an obvious place to 
link the present modelling approach to the work of, say, Strevens (2003). 
 
4. Methodological Rules for the Distribution of Labour 
 
Next, I should like to say a little about the ways that methodological rules might be 
employed in calculating the appropriate distribution of labour. First and foremost, I 
should like to emphasise that to understand science as properly guided by 
methodological rules is not to commit oneself to the view that there is a single list of 
rules that operate concurrently and continuously. Indeed, the problem with thinking of 
rules in such a way—as one might, for example, understand the Ten Commandments 
of the Old Testament—is that situations may occur where obeying one requires 
violating another (and vice versa), even if they can typically be obeyed 
simultaneously. For example, to honour my mother I may have to lie to her when she 
asks if she is fat. To respond to her question truthfully, on the other hand, would result 
in dishonouring her! 
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A partial solution to this kind of problem is to have an explicit priority order for the 
rules. In fact, this is implicit in my earlier mention of the idea that we want to 
maximise the total work performed as well as to ensure that work done on each theory 
is in proportion to its relative degree of confirmation. One way of handling this would 
be to say that when the possible distributions of labour with the correct proportions 
have been enumerated, in any given calculation, the preferred possibility should 
maximise the total work performed. 
 
More subtle approaches are also possible. Perhaps sometimes maximising the total 
work performed is more important than having the correct proportions (and vice 
versa). So one may express priorities using conditional clauses, such as: if only 
approximately having the correct proportions rather than having precisely the right 
proportions can lead to more than n times as much work output, then select a 
distribution of labour that approximately has the correct proportions and maximises 
work output. (Note this is quite different from declaring a general rule: select the 
distribution of labour that approximately or precisely has the correct proportions and 
maximises work output.) One may go on to specify what counts as ‘approximately 
having the correct proportions’ by stating a specific fraction by which the actual 
proportions may deviate from the ideal proportions. 
 
Somewhat more radically, it is possible to think of the set of applicable 
methodological rules as being entirely context dependent. Priority considerations may 
then be sunk into the rules; e.g., to follow on from the previous example, the rule in 
some contexts may be ‘Select the distribution of labour which has approximately the 
correct proportions and maximises work output’, whereas the rule in others may be 
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‘Select the distribution of labour which has precisely the correct proportions and 
otherwise maximises work output’. Alternatively, this could be thought of as a 
situation where a single meta-rule applies. This would look something like this: In 
context class C, apply rule-set R, with priority ordering PR; in context class C1, apply 
rule-set R1, with priority ordering PR1; and so on. 
 
This may all seem terribly messy. But the reasons to make methodological 
considerations messy are compelling. Critiques of the very idea of any ‘scientific 
method’, such as Feyerabend’s (1975), appear so effective only because they attack a 
naïve approach to the notion, namely one where there are context-invariant rules (like 
the aforementioned Ten Commandments). If we instead allow that the rules can 
change radically across contexts of inquiry, then the power of the historical examples 
marshaled by Feyerabend is diminished. To be specific, we may understand his work 
as helping to delineate the proper contexts of applicability of the rules he discusses. 
We may avoid the retreat to relativism. In a nutshell, we may agree that ‘anything 
goes’ (or accept that ‘almost anything goes’) across all contexts of inquiry, but deny 
that ‘anything goes’ (or ‘almost anything goes’) in any specific context of inquiry.16 
 
5. Conclusion: Bounded Rationality and Striking the Balance 
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
16 By ‘context’, I mean something more fine-grained than a paradigm qua disciplinary matrix; for even 
within the boundaries of ‘normal science’, accepting that something like this exists, there will be times 
at which it is proper to devote more puzzle solving effort in one direction rather than another. See 
Rowbottom (2011c). Thus by a context I mean not only available theories, instruments, and personnel, 
but also other resources (e.g. financial) and research findings (e.g. classifications and reports on tests of 
models). 
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So what is the result of this paper? We have an overview of the kind of factors to 
build into an elementary (social epistemological) model of a scientific community, 
further factors that might be introduced to make it less idealized, and how the rules of 
method to be employed might be understood in a context dependent fashion. But this 
leaves the big question of whether such a model is implementable, say at the level of a 
research group (rather than the whole of science), and hence of any practical value 
whatsoever. In closing, I will tackle various aspects of this issue. 
 
First and foremost, the complexity required for a reasonably realistic model—both 
with respect to relevant factors in the situation, and the methodological rules to be 
employed—is considerable. Hence, I think that there will be few situations, at best, in 
which solving balancing problems (even assuming the accuracy of the data) will be a 
pen and paper exercise. Rather, I believe that computer simulations might be a 
suitable tool. Indeed my interest in the modelling approach outlined here is partly as a 
result of the increasing use of such simulations in social epistemology.17 
 
Second, however, there is a more general question. Is finding an optimal solution to 
balancing problems possible even when computational problems are disregarded? Or 
is our rationality bounded in such a way, following Simon (1955), that this 
expectation is entirely unrealistic? One worry here, in particular, is that any computer 
model we build will only ever reflect the limited choices that we are able to consider, 
and that simulations will only be run on the data that we are able to gather (or 
automate the gathering of); so that in a special sense, qua problem solvers rather than 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
17 See, for example, Hegselmann and Krause (2006), Zollman (2007), Douven (2009), Weisberg and 
Muldoon (2009), and Olsson (2011). 
Preprint – Forthcoming in Studies in History and Philosophy of Science 
29 
calculators, computers are only ever as good as their programmers.18 My response, in 
due humility, is simply to admit the validity of this concern. Perhaps, indeed, optimal 
solutions are generally—or, rather more optimistically, typically—beyond our grasp. 
But this is compatible with the modelling strategy advocated here being sufficient for 
achieving less troublesome tasks, such as providing solutions that are sufficiently 
proximal to optimal to be better than those we could otherwise (reliably) arrive at. 
And as an empiricist, I think we should find out what these models can do, providing 
this is not prohibitively expensive, before writing them off. 
 
Of course, some might think that the whole approach is wrong-headed; that doing 
social epistemology by considering fundamental factors, and then adding more in 
order to make higher-order corrections, is undesirable even if possible. (Ideally we 
shall want to consider the finances and equipment available, inter alia, for example.) 
Ditto for considering multiple rules of inquiry, and then meta-rules concerning when 
those should be applied. Perhaps it would be better to use heuristics, which can be 
accurate enough to be fit for purpose (on a case by case basis) but much more 
economical? This line of objection is inspired by Wimsatt (2007). My response is 
twofold. On the one hand, there may very well be some situations in which accuracy 
is of considerably greater import than economy, and in which the extra expense of 
employing a computer simulation is acceptable. (That is to say, the cost-benefit 
analysis may favour heuristics in most cases. But it does not follow that it does in all. 
This is an empirical question to which I do not wish to guess the answer; my sample 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
18 Simon (1955, p. 99) aims at an account of ‘rational behavior that is compatible with the access to 
information and the computational capacities that are actually possessed by organisms, including man, 
in the kinds of environments in which such organisms exist’. Here we are concerned not with 
‘computational capacities’, which we have seen can be expanded by the use of computers, but with 
‘access to information’.	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size is too small and selective.) On the other, experimentation in silico may be of 
service in the development of new, and better, heuristics for organizing research. It 
may disclose previously unnoticed correlations between variables, the existence of 
which we may corroborate via socio-historical studies, for instance. So in summary, I 
do not want to engage in a methodological dispute at this level. I simply think that we 
should investigate the avenue, provided that the opportunity cost is not too great. It 
may be a dead end, of course. Such is the nature of research. 
 
Third, however, a more specific criticism of the proposed modelling strategy is that 
many of the factors mentioned above—e.g. skills, such as problem solving, and 
dispositions, such as industry—are not operationalised. Hence, one might think it is 
unclear about how they could be used in any practical model, computational or 
otherwise. I admit that there is some justice to this worry. But I think legitimate 
disagreements over such measurement issues are natural, and I do not want to become 
embroiled in them in the present context (because doing so would lead to lengthy 
digressions). For example, one might measure a scientist’s industry by looking at how 
many papers she produces, or how many experiments she manages to perform, in a 
complexity-weighted fashion. Different forms of measurement will have different 
advantages, and clearly some will be appropriate in some cases whereas others will 
not. (Measuring industry by looking at experiments performed is hopeless when one 
is interested in a theoretician, for example. This is just common sense.) So I prefer 
just to leave matters open at this level; the important point is that the approach is 
flexible enough to cope with different forms of measurement. Only if one takes a 
strong operationalist stance like (the early) Bridgman (1927, p. 5), where ‘we mean 
by any concept nothing more than a set of operations; the concept is synonymous with 
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the corresponding set of operations’ might one see this as a deep problem. In effect, 
this would mean that terms like ‘industry’, and related ones like ‘hardworking’ or 
‘lazy’, may fail to be meaningful; and, more precisely, that I am presently unable to 
show that they are meaningful by specifying the sets of operations with which they 
are synonymous (according to linguistic convention).19 
 
In summary, in this piece I provide the basis for a research programme. I can provide 
no guarantee that it will prove fruitful, for I am no oracle. But I also see no reason to 
doubt that we can do somewhat better than we presently do, when it comes to 
considerations of scientific method, by giving this programme a go. To be frank, we 
could hardly do much worse. It is hardly as if we have some well-developed and 
highly successful approach—as against the overgeneralizations of Kuhn and 
Popper—that it is intended to replace! 
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